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I feel proud and grateful that Nicaragua was chosen to be host for this Conference by the unanimous vote of the delegates last year in Santo Domingo. It spells continental recognition of our economic efforts, as well as of our political stability which, fortified by democratic principles, has resulted in dynamic stability.

Our progress and freedom have run along parallel lines, as have work and the dignity of man within a peaceful revolution, and along these paths we shall continue our forward progress.

In commemoration and in honor of each and every distinguished participant, and in recognition of my people's efforts, I declare for Nicaragua that this year of 1970 be known as "Saving and Loan for Housing Year."

Upon officially inaugurating this Eighth Inter-American Savings and Loan Conference, I fervently invoke the blessing of the Almighty—in the spirit of our American forefathers—that this Conference produce real benefits for the peoples and governments of this hemisphere.

Thank you.

THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(Mr. PHILBIN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I include in the RECORD the very impressive report filed by our able, distinguished colleague and dear friend, the Honorable JAMES A. BYRNE of Pennsylvania, head of a special House Armed Services subcommittee, on the subject of the pacification program in South Vietnam.

The committee was composed of Mr. BYRNE as chairman, and our able distinguished colleagues and friends, Hon. WILLIAM G. BRAY, of Indiana and Hon. CHARLES H. WILSON of California.

The committee visited and toured the total pacification area, and its report is a fine, constructive document that should be read by every Member of Congress and by the American people.

I compliment the esteemed Members for an excellent piece of work, and Mr. BYRNE for his outstanding leadership.

The report follows:

To: The Hon. L. Mendel Rivers, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee.

From: James A. Byrne, Chairman, Special Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.

Subject: The Pacification Program in South Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, herewith is a report from me on the study made by a special subcommittee composed of three members of the Armed Services Committee, namely the Hon. William G. Bray of Indiana, the Hon. Charles H. Wilson of California, and myself, made on the scene in January, 1970.

The pacification program in South Viet Nam made tremendous progress in 1969; however, there are still many problems remaining and we should be prepared for the possibility of further setbacks as the Republic of Viet Nam struggles for stability.

The success of the pacification efforts is vital to the policy of Vietnamizing the war.

Pacification seeks to provide security for the people to establish and enhance local government responsible to the people and to meet the economic and social needs of the people.

This program must succeed if the South Vietnamese Government is going to stand on its own feet in the years ahead as the Americans withdraw from Viet Nam.

All the evidence we saw indicated that the pacification program has made significant strides in 1969. The trend of development is encouraging.

The South Vietnamese top leadership appears to be putting forth genuine efforts to make government more responsible at the local level.

A growing number of people are in secure areas and on-the-scene observers we talked to indicated a growing belief in the government on the part of the people.

Indications of progress include:

The Regional and Popular Forces have been increased considerably in strength and the Popular Self-Defense Forces—the farmers and workers who defend their homes at night or when under attack—have been armed and greatly expanded. Joining the PSDS (Popular Self-Defense Services) constitutes a commitment to the government both for the man and his family.

Security for hamlets has improved significantly. At the beginning of 1969, only a little more than 50 percent of the hamlets were in the secure category. By the end of the year, more than 85 percent were in that category. The percentage of population controlled by the Viet Cong is less than 3 percent.

There has been a significant increase in the number of elected village and hamlet governments—in both cases the number of such governments elected has jumped from less than one-half in early 1969 to more than 90 percent today. Viet Nam is a land of hamlets and villages so this strengthening of local government is of great importance.

The large number of displaced persons has been and continues to be a major social and economic problem. However, during 1969, the number of displaced persons has been reduced from well over one million to about 268,000. During the year, some 488,000 were returned to their villages and 586,000 were resettled.

The Chieu Hoi, or Open Arms program, designed to induce the Viet Cong to rally to the side of the government, had its best year by far in 1969. During that year, more than 47,000 came over to the government side, as compared to only 18,000 in 1968.

These are just some of the indicators of progress.

During our three-day stay in Viet Nam, the subcommittee spoke to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker; Gen. Creighton Abrams, commander of U.S. forces and the U.S. Military Assistance Commission in Viet Nam; William E. Colby, deputy to the ambassador in charge of pacification; numerous American military and civilian officials at various levels; and many Vietnamese officials.

The subcommittee also spent a day with pacification officials in the Danang area and visited a school and a resettlement village.

I support the policy of turning the conduct of the war over to the Vietnamese as rapidly as possible. Therefore I was particularly anxious to study the progress of the pacification effort, which is the key to Vietnamization.

The continued progress in pacification in 1970, as was achieved in 1969, will be of immeasurable benefit to the Viet Nam Government.

However, anyone who has followed developments in Viet Nam over the years has learned the value of skepticism. No other war or major undertaking has suffered so much from overly optimistic estimates.

We all remember pacification when indices of progress prove to be illusory. There are problems remaining. There is a shortage of well-trained middle level leadership.

The Viet Cong infrastructure has not been seriously damaged. The National Police and the working of legal procedures at the local level need a great deal of improvement.

The enemy retains the capacity to cause

serious difficulty. The success of the pacification program is anathema to the enemy's hopes and it would be a mistake to assume that he would not challenge it. We should be prepared for new attacks and setbacks.

The most knowledgeable people we talked to expect some enemy offensive before the beginning of the rainy season in late spring.

It should be remembered also that under the best of circumstances the pacification program will require the free world's moral, financial and technical assistance for some time to come.

The pacification program is going in the right direction and has made significant progress, but has a long and difficult road to travel.

It can succeed if its present rate of progress is continued and there is no slackening in hard work on the part of the Vietnamese and no loss of patience and perseverance on the part of both the Vietnamese and the Americans.

AIR POLLUTION

(Mr. SANDMAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. SANDMAN. Mr. Speaker, air pollution has reached a point in this country where it has a profound effect upon the very existence of mankind. If there was ever a time to attack this problem, it is now.

I heartily endorse the President's environmental program, particularly as it relates to the problems of air pollution. I firmly believe that the setting of national air quality standards is timely and effective.

We do not know the full extent to which air pollution damages human health, but we do know that it is hazardous.

National standards would eliminate our present, more cumbersome procedure by which each State proposes air quality standards which must be approved or disapproved by the Federal Government. The President's proposal would allow the States to concentrate on actual control of pollution.

The President's proposal will require all States to control air pollution. No State will be a haven for polluters. No citizen will lack protection because he happens to live outside a designated air quality control region.

I also support a revised system of depreciation allowances for those industries that install new devices that curtail the expulsion of foul odors, dust, and smoke in the atmosphere.

WORLD FREEDOM DAY

(Mr. DERWINSKI asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, since January 23, 1955, the people of the Republic of China have annually commemorated the massive choice for freedom made by more than 14,000 Chinese Communist POW's of the Korean war a year earlier. This annual Freedom Day has inspired and encouraged thousands of mainland Chinese to defect and find freedom in the Republic of China and other areas of free Asia. The expansion of this movement over the years has been so

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impressive that in 1968 the World Anti-Communist League decided to observe January 23 as World Freedom Day.

This past January 23, World Freedom Day was successfully observed in the Republic of China and by freedom activists in all of free Asia, the United States, and other parts of the world. The collective determination shown in not only holding the lines of world freedom but also extending them toward the captive nations of Asia, Europe, in the Soviet Union, and in Cuba cannot but bring encouragement to the 1 billion captive people in the Red Empire. In the confident hope that this movement will expand further in the trying period ahead, I commend to the thoughtful reading of all Americans the addresses and significant messages that made up the program in the Republic of China:

MASS RALLY FOR OBSERVING WORLD FREEDOM DAY REPUBLIC OF CHINA, JANUARY 23, 1970

PROGRAM

1. Meeting opens.
2. Hymn of Freedom Day.
3. Peal of Freedom Bell.
4. General Chairman takes Rostrum.
5. Attendance Stands Up at Attention.
6. National Anthem.
7. Salute to National Flag.
8. Reading of Messages from President Chiang and Others.
9. Address by General Chairman Ku Cheng-kang.
10. Speech by Vice President Yen. (Band Music).
11. Speech by Gen. Thomas Lane of the U.S.
12. Report by Korean Freedom-Fighter Mr. Dong Joen Lee.
13. Report by Vietnamese Freedom Fighter Col. Tran Van Dac. (Band Music).
14. Introduction of Newly Arrived Freedom-Fighters by General Chairman Ku.
15. Report by a Representative of Chinese Freedom-Fighters.
16. Introduction of and Speech by Mr. Lubmoir Hanak, President of the European Cordination Center.
17. Reading of Rally Declaration and Outgoing Messages.
18. Hymn of Freedom Day.
19. Cheers.
20. Band Music.
21. Meeting Ends.

PRESIDENT CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S FREEDOM DAY MESSAGE

More than 14,000 Chinese Communist POWs of the Korean War resisted threats and overcame difficulties in their courageous choice of freedom outside the bamboo curtain. On January 23 of 1954, they reached this free island bastion of the Republic of China. Their dauntless spirit and intrepid action have made a matchless contribution to the history of man's struggle for freedom.

January 23 has subsequently been observed as Freedom Day. This movement to enhance human dignity and encourage mankind's struggle for freedom has countered attempts at enslavement and has won widespread support among the free and democratic nations of the world. Consequently, the World Anti-Communist League decided in 1968 to observe January 23 as World Freedom Day. Growth of this movement bears witness to the rising unity of the world's anti-Communist forces. The determination and fighting spirit of enslaved peoples have been heightened immeasurably in their quest for liberty.

I have often pointed out that Communism is at the root of all aggressive wars and

that the Peiping regime is the source of evil behind all undertakings of aggression. Until the Chinese mainland is freed from the Red scourge, the world cannot expect an era of tranquility.

Rapid progress has been made in all aspects of the Republic of China's *San Min Chu I* (Three Principles of the People) reconstruction in the national recovery base of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. This has made an important contribution to the safeguarding of peace and freedom in the Asian and Pacific region. The Peiping regime has been forced down the road of political disintegration, social disorder, economic desecration and military upheaval. The regime is at the end of its rope and far-reaching changes can be expected on the mainland at any moment. Collapse of the regime is inevitable as soon as it comes under attack by external freedom forces supported by the anti-Maoists and anti-Communists of the mainland.

The triumph of freedom and defeat of slavery are immutably ordained. History supplies the undeniable proof. However, peace is not to be obtained by procrastination. Freedom has to be won by applying moral strength to the struggle. We need to unite all our brothers at home and abroad, military and civilian alike, and provide opportunity for every individual to contribute his or her wisdom and strength. All of us must dedicate ourselves absolutely and heroically to the cause of the Anti-Mao and National Salvation Front.

We can hope that our mainland compatriots will devote their attention and their energies to the self-salvation movement to destroy Mao and the Communists and assure the survival of the Nation. All who are strong of body and of will must rise against tyranny, ally themselves with the awakened cadres of the Communist Party and military, prepare to join the great army of the National Revolution and strike a fatal blow at the Peiping regime whenever opportunity permits.

Even more importantly, we have to unite with the freedom-loving people of the world, develop the strength of universal principles and justice, sweep away the dark clouds of appeasement and compromise in the face of the Communist peril and assure the progress of this worldwide movement to protect freedom. We are convinced that the early recovery of the Chinese mainland is indispensable to the reinforcement of Asian security and the safeguarding of freedom and peace throughout the world.

MESSAGE FROM H. E. NGUYEN VAN THIEU, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

On behalf of the people and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam I wish to extend to you my sincere greeting on the 16th anniversary of Freedom Day.

It is most fitting that the historic event of the choice of freedom by 22,000 Chinese and Korean POWs on January 23, 1954, is now celebrated as the World Freedom Day. It marks the undaunted spirit of freedom loving peoples who elected to abandon their homes and their ancestral lands rather than live under Communist yoke; the shining example set by the Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war who refused to return to their respective homelands upon their release despite Communist blandishments, coercion, and intimidation has ever since become the symbol of man's deep appreciations for freedom.

In Vietnam after the partition of the country in 1954, nearly one million people from North Vietnam moved to the south to carry on the fight against communism today.

Under the RVN Open Arms program over 150,000 VS cadres have rallied to the cause of freedom championed by the RVN people and government. Peoples living under Communist

oppressive rule behind and from the Bamboo Curtains are yearning for freedom.

Your observance of the World Freedom Day rekindles their hope and galvanizes our determination to fight the Communist oppression and hightens, strengthens the solidarity of free men everywhere.

I sincerely wish you great success in all the commemorative activities on this World Freedom Day.

NGUYEN VAN THIEU,
President of the Republic of Vietnam.

MESSAGE FROM HIS EXCELLENCY A. SOMOZA, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA

REYOURSLET,
December 11.

I joyously support encouragement and guidance commemorating World Freedom Day trusting successful triumph.

MESSAGE FROM HIS EXCELLENCY FIDEL SANCHEZ HERNANDEZ, PRESIDENTE DE EL SALVADOR

Atentamente me refiero a su comunicacion de fecha diciembre 11, por la cual me invita a que formule una Declaracion sobre el "Dia de la Libertad Mundial" que se conmemorara en la Republica de China el proximo 23 de enero.

Estimo altamente el significado de esa celebracion y que tenga lugar en China, pais que ejemplarmente aliena a un profundo ideal de progreso dentro de un regimen de dignidad humana.

Pláceme manifestarle por este medio mis expresiones de simpatia por ese movimiento en pro de la Libertad Mundial, así como mis votos porque su tradicional celebracion con tribuya a recordar a todas las naciones del mundo que el bien más preciado de los pueblos es el de su libertad y que su resguardo corresponde a todos los hombres dignos de la tierra.

Me es grato aprovechar esta oportunidad para patentizarle mis demostraciones de mi especial consideración.

MESSAGE FROM H. E. G. EYSKENS, PRIME MINISTER OF BELGIUM

Belgium as a free nation has always stood up for the cause of the victims of persecution throughout the world.

Therefore on the occasion of the "World Freedom Day" which will be commemorated in the Republic of China this coming January 23, I wish to convey to you and to your Committee a message of sympathy and encouragement.

MESSAGE FROM H. E. GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS, PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE

On occasion of World Freedom Day please accept warmest greetings and best wishes for success in your work. I would like to stress the importance of the purposes of your committee which aim at the defence of freedom and independence of the peoples of the free world. The attention of Greek people who have experienced all kinds of Communist aggression is with you.

MESSAGE FROM HIS EXCELLENCY TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA, PRIME MINISTER OF MALAYSIA

It gives me great pleasure in sending this message on the occasion of "World Freedom Day" in the Republic of China, which falls on January 23, this year.

It is a day to be remembered by all those who cherish freedom and appreciate human values and dignity. The first freedom day was observed in 1954 on January 23 when more than 22,000 communist prisoners of war of the Korea War refused to return to their communist dominated homelands and 14,000 of them chose to make their future home in the Republic of China.

Ever since "World Freedom Day" has been observed, it has promoted the people in the free world to struggle for human dignity, jus-

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U.S. Aides in Vietnam Scorn Phoenix Project

By Robert G. Kaiser Jr.
Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, Feb. 16—The program to neutralize the Vietcong infrastructure in South Vietnam is called Phoenix, and it is a bird of several feathers.

Some war critics in the United States have attacked Phoenix as an instrument of mass political murder. Such sinister descriptions are not heard in Vietnam, where Phoenix has the reputation of a poorly plotted farce, sometimes with tragic overtones.

The contradiction between Phoenix's lurid reputation as a sort of Vietnamese Murder, Inc., and the scorn with which it is widely regarded here typifies one of the most popular grievances of American officials in Vietnam: "They don't understand at home what's going on out here."

The gulf between home-front and battlefield is likely to appear Tuesday in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing room, when American pacification officials are expected to be questioned closely about the Phoenix program.

Because Phoenix is an offspring of the CIA and because its operations have always been obscured by the cloak of official secrecy, the Foreign Relations Committee may discuss the program in a closed session. But Phoenix's secrets are not well kept in Vietnam.

The South Vietnamese-run program does involve killing. American statistics on Phoenix results (which are radically more conservative than the Vietnamese figures) show 19,534 members of the so-called Vietcong infrastructure (VCI) "neutralized" during 1969—6,187 of them killed.

The rest were captured (8,515) or rallied to the government cause (4,832).

But several officials involved in the program, including some who are

sharply critical of Phoenix, note a fact that is not tabulated in official statistics: A small fraction, probably one tenth to one fifth, of the VCI neutralized are captured or killed on purpose. The overwhelming majority are rounded up in military operations, killed in battles, ambushes or other military action, and described afterward as infrastructure. Only a handful are targeted, diligently pursued and captured or killed.

Phoenix Not Working

"The most important point about Phoenix," said one official who had access to all the program's statistics and records, "is that it isn't working."

That view is repeated by official and confidential U.S. establishments here, and it has been the conclusion of official and confidential studies, including recent reports by the CIA and the deputy under secretary of the Army, James V. Siena. Phoenix has failed to neutralize a significant number of important Vietcong officials.

"We are not bothering them now, that's for damn sure," one of the senior Americans in Vietnam said not long ago.

A common description of Phoenix one hears from officials in Vietnam is of a program without substance. A share of the killing and capturing that goes on in the war is attributed statistically to Phoenix, but—many officials say—most of Phoenix's share could easily be attributed to something or somebody else.

Phoenix's unsavory reputation

apparently stems from its clandestine nature, its connections with some deliberate assassinations, and accusations made by several public figures and army veterans about its ac-

An Idea of the CIA

Phoenix was the idea of the CIA, and until last July it was run by the agency.

Phoenix operations conducted by Provincial Reconnaissance Units have involved assassinations. These units, another CIA organization composed of Vietnamese troops and U.S. advisers, were organized primarily as a counter-terror group to operate behind enemy lines. Assassination of Vietcong officials was one of their assignments.

But the units are now under local Vietnamese control, and have lost much of their ferocious reputation. "They've lost 50 per cent of their effectiveness," according to one U.S. official.

"There's some killing, but this is a war. There are no organized bump-off squads," one official with no brief for Phoenix insisted recently. Efforts to find contrary evidence were unsuccessful. Many of the accusations against Phoenix cannot be verified here. Some seem to be based on misunderstandings of Phoenix terminology and statistics.

Officials in Vietnam are critical of Phoenix on many other counts. In recent interviews with several officials involved in the program, a reporter heard these points:

- Phoenix is potentially dangerous, for it could be used against political opponents of the regime, whether they were Vietcong or not. However, there is no evidence that this has happened yet.

- Phoenix contributes substantially to corruption. Some local officials demand payoffs with threats of arrests under the Phoenix program, or release genuine Vietcong for cash.

- Phoenix is helping the Vietcong more than hurting it. By throwing people in prison who are often only low-level operatives—sometimes people forced to cooperate with the Vietcong when they lived in VC territory—the government is alienating a large slice of the population. "We should not jail people," said Ho Ngoc Nhuan, chairman of the rural development committee of the Vietnamese House. "That makes them enemies of the government."

A Campaign is Necessary

All the officials interviewed were persuaded that a concerted campaign against the Vietcong organization is necessary if South Vietnam is to have any chance of independent survival in the long run, but all also agreed that the Phoenix program had failed to hurt the VC organization so far.

Phoenix was adopted by the Vietnamese government, at American urging (or perhaps insistence), in December 1967. It is supposed to unify the fragmented intelligence agencies in Vietnam, and share the best information among all operating units. Provincial security committees, part of the Phoenix structure, also have the power to try and sentence suspects to prison for up to two years.

There are 441 Americans attached to Phoenix, all as advisers. Americans play no direct role in Phoenix operations.

Phoenix offices in the 44

provinces and most of the 242 districts of South Vietnam (all with U.S. advisers) are supposed to maintain dossiers on Vietcong officials in their area and a "blacklist" of wanted men and women.

Ideally, Special Branch Police (an intelligence unit of the National Police, advised and financed by the CIA), local troops and Provincial Reconnaissance Units are supposed to conduct operations to arrest these wanted persons. Arrested individuals are interrogated. When there is some evidence of a Vietcong connection, they are brought to trial before the provincial court. High-level suspects are supposed to be bound over to a military field court.

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Reality Differs From Model

As so often in Vietnam, reality bears small resemblance to this ideal model. Interviews with officials and observations in the countryside reveal deviations from the ideal.

The main problem is that Vietnamese don't seem interested in really prosecuting the program.

"They just aren't interested," said one official. "They don't want to be caught trying to get the VCI if they think maybe next year the VCI will be in control."

Some local officials have made private accommodations with the Vietcong. U.S. and Vietnamese officials say. They are unwilling to upset these arrangements by chasing VCI.

Only in the last few months has the central government put strong emphasis on Phoenix. Some officials think this new pressure may improve performance.

Largely because of Vietnamese disinterest, the local Phoenix offices simply do not work. Many keep no records. Others mount no operations. Phoenix is often run by poor-quality personnel, chosen for their jobs by local officials who don't want to waste their good people on the program. Most district officers are run by junior army officers who have little sense of the sophisticated political problems of hunting down Vietcong officials.

Neutralization Quotas

Perhaps to prod recalcitrant local officials, the central government assigns Phoenix quotas to the provinces. Thus a province chief has to report neutralization of a certain number of VCI every month to stay in good. "They will meet every quota that's established for them," one American adviser noted.

But meeting the quotas often means disregarding any standards. Officials often count every man arrested, even if he is released immediately for lack of evidence. American advisers refuse to confirm many of these alleged neutralizations, accounting for much of the difference of almost 100 percent between U.S. and South Vietnamese Phoenix statistics.

Quota-conscious district and province chiefs also pad their Phoenix figures with any number of citizens captured or killed in military operations, whether genuine VCI or not.

"Vietnamization" of Phoenix has, in a sense, already been completed—the only Americans involved are advisers. But some officials think most of the advisers should now be withdrawn.

"We've done all we can," one official said. "If they want to get the VCI, they can do it. We can't do anything more."

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consciously and unconsciously from those who live with them and they learn to develop according to the demands and expectations of adults who are significant to them. These "significant" adults are mothers and fathers and if we are to understand and meet the needs of these "disadvantaged" children we must make a large investment in helping mothers understand the importance of the learnings children acquire in their early years and we must also help them contribute positively to the development of these learnings.

Our Parent Aides are the mothers or grandmothers in the homes in which we teach. We presently have forty eight aides, one-third of whom are on welfare roles.

These aides come from a wide range of economic, educational and occupational settings. All of them live within the boundaries of inner city. About one-third of the aides have worked with us for the two year period. During the present school year we lost several and had to begin the search for other interested mothers. The major reason for losing these women is moving!

As urban renewal sweeps the city, more homes are being destroyed and families are lost in the maze of destruction—construction, illness, maternity and acceptance of full-time jobs were also cited as reasons for losing mothers.

Present Aides meet together about one evening every six weeks. These meetings were held to keep them in touch with each other, inform them of certain principles related to young children and encourage them to become very involved in their child's interests and skills. The aides are at various stages of development and many of them are able to assume leadership roles in the program. Others participate only with much direction and still others, approximately four or five, show little enthusiasm and ability to work well with the child.

In addition to these meetings, the teachers spend time planning the future events and activities with their aides, and do extensive homevisiting to the homes of children whose mothers are not aides. These visits provide an opportunity for mother and teacher to talk in general about the program, its goals and progress and in particular about her child, his interests, problems and development. Many teachers have also held evening meetings in the parent aides home for parents of children who attend class at that aide's house. These meetings have been particularly successful and enjoyable. Perhaps, the more familiar atmosphere of meeting in a home in their own neighborhood and the company of neighborhood mothers contributes to the lively conversation engaged in at these meetings. This open agenda type meeting has drawn exchange on various topics: children's eating habits, bedtime problems, the "good" and "bad" of television, older children's teasing younger siblings and the all-time favorite "fighting."

One of the remarks heard repeatedly was . . . "how good it is to have a night out to myself."

During the latter months of the '69 school year, the community teachers requested more time to plan and work with their parent aides. In an effort to provide some opportunities for this, we used one to two hours each Monday in May and found that these were very valuable sessions. By simply asking a parent aide: "What activities would you like to include in the program in the next few weeks?", teachers received dozens of ideas of the activities most enjoyed by the aides and also discovered which activities the mothers felt were the most important for the children. Language time and trips seemed to receive the highest rating. These experiences prompted the teachers to request more association with the aides on a regular basis

during the next school year. One suggestion which seemed to receive all of teachers' approval was to use one-half of our Monday In-Service for Parent Aide sessions. Further explanation will be given this in our recommendations appending this report.

In order to receive more reactions from parent aides and other parents involved in the Community Teacher Program, we undertook taped-questionnaire interviews with twenty four parent aides in May, 1969. These tapes are on file at the Community Teacher Office, 46 Moran Street. It is our impression that the Community Teacher Program has successfully demonstrated the feasibility of home instruction for both young children and their mothers. Our observations, evaluations of the children, taped interviews with parents and teachers, and multiple questionnaire support our belief that the Community Teacher Program has contributed effectively to:

1. An increase of knowledge and skills in the children which will enable them to meet the school situation with greater ability and flexibility.

2. An increase of knowledge and skills in the teachers which will enable them to better understand the needs of young children and contribute more positively to their development.

3. An increase of knowledge and skills in the teachers which has enabled them to understand how young children learn, the effects of deprivation on learning and how to meet the challenge of teaching in such an innovative setting as the Community Teacher Program.

Interviews with kindergarten teachers in six inner-city schools clearly support our hope that children who participated in the Community Teacher Program entered school quite prepared and maintained gains throughout their kindergarten year.

Presently, Dr. A. P. Scheiner, Pediatrician, and Lynn Cramer, social worker have seen and made reports on fourteen of our children. Two are reported to be mildly retarded while twelve fall within the normal intelligence category but are functioning below their capacities due to environmental handicaps. Nine of the thirteen also exhibited a variety of physical disorders and follow-ups will be done on these children. Two children have been recommended for the Day Care Center for the Handicapped, one child has been placed in a more structured nursery school and five children were placed in the special class within our own program. Efforts are now being made to work closely with the Convalescent Hospital for Children and the Neighborhood Health Center to initiate a program of health-education services on a family continuity basis. (Data available at Community Teacher Office, 46 Moran Street, Rochester, New York.)

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. DELLENBACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the subject of my special order today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oregon?

There was no objection.

AUTOMOTIVE AIR POLLUTION

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. FARBSTINE) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. FARBSTINE. Mr. Speaker, on July 31 of last year, I introduced H.R. 13225, legislation to ban the sale of the internal combustion engine unless stringent new emissions standards could be met. The purpose of this legislation was to force the American auto industry to develop a nonpolluting engine.

This legislation, the amendment I offered on the floor of the House in September to accomplish approximately the same objective, and the hearing I held in New York City in connection with this question appear to have played a significant role in giving national focus to a question which just last summer was primarily the concern of residents of California.

The extent of that concern in New York City can be found in the results of my December constituent questionnaire which found a 19-to-1 ratio in favor of legislation to ban the internal combustion engine. I received over 8,000 replies to this one-question questionnaire.

The wording of the question was based upon that of a national public opinion poll taken last fall and read as follows:

I NEED YOUR HELP

The automobile industry does not appear to believe that most people are really concerned about automotive-caused air pollution.

Exhaust from the existing kind of automobile engine, the internal combustion engine, causes air pollution. I have introduced legislation to outlaw the sale of the internal combustion engine effective in 1978 in order to force auto makers to develop other engines.

By casting your ballot on this question, you can let the auto industry and the Congress know where the people of New York stand.

Please complete, stamp and mail the questionnaire before December 30.

Do you favor legislation to ban the internal combustion engine?

The results revealed that middle-age respondents were more supportive of a legislative ban and that women were more favorably inclined than men. The respondents included 51.2 percent women and 48.8 percent men.

The breakdown of the results by sex and age groups follows:

RESPONSE TO LEGISLATIVE BAN OF INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINE

	Male (percent)			Female (percent)			Total
	Under 30	30-65	65 and over	Under 30	30-65	65 and over	
Favor.....	91.9	94.6	90.3	95.5	98.1	94.1	95.2
Opposed.....	8.1	5.4	8.7	4.5	1.9	5.9	4.8

The auto is responsible for 60 percent of air pollution in the United States and up to 92 percent in urban areas. It is clear that the public mood is not for modest modifications in current ap-

proaches to pollution control, but for radical departures to stem the mad momentum of environmental destruction. The auto must be cleaned up if the problem of air pollution is to be solved.

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The intensity of the feelings of the residents of Lower and Middle Manhattan on this subject is revealed not only in numerical results of the poll, but in the following additional remarks which were written in on the returned questionnaires:

I am going to have to leave the city because of the pollution.

Emphatically.

Everyone I know agrees this is necessary. The air pollution makes it difficult for me to breathe and sleep at nights.

Immediately.

Private automobiles should be banned from Manhattan and other large cities.

I favor any recommendations of Ralph Nader.

Start with buses.

STATE DEPARTMENT REMARKS ON SAIGON GOVERNMENT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. HAMILTON) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I have recently been corresponding with the State Department on the subject of the South Vietnamese Government. Because of the informative nature of the replies I have received from Mr. H. G. Torbert, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, I think they are worthy of public attention. While not all of my inquiries were answered to my complete satisfaction, I want to commend Mr. Torbert for his efforts.

His letters reveal much that is sobering, and even discouraging, about the Saigon government and our relationship with it, and help one to understand the sometimes dubious activities of a political system so recently exposed to democratic practices.

The correspondence follows:

NOVEMBER 13, 1969.

Hon. WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The structure and functioning of the South Vietnamese government are prime topics of debate and concern. President Nixon and you are often accused, as were your predecessors, of trying to "prop up" the government in Saigon. The critics say that if the South Vietnamese government would become less corrupt, broaden its base, and become more responsive to the people, greater progress in the Vietnamization of the war could be made.

My own thinking on these issues would be aided considerably if you answered for me the following questions pertaining to the South Vietnamese government and our alliance with it:

CORRUPTION

1. How prevalent is corruption in the present government?

2. What is the gross loss, in monetary terms for FY 1969, of American military and economic goods due to corruption on the part of the South Vietnamese?

3. What steps is the United States taking to reduce this corruption?

4. What steps has the Thieu-Ky government taken to reduce corruption among its own officials?

5. What progress has been made in these efforts in the past year?

6. Is there any evidence that Thieu and Ky are themselves involved in the corruption?

POLITICS

1. Have Thieu and Ky made efforts to broaden the base of their government? If so, what are they?

2. What is the United States doing to encourage Thieu and Ky to broaden their political base? What progress has there been in these efforts?

3. What is the make-up of the present cabinet? What was the effect of the last reshuffling of cabinet positions?

4. What groups, ethnic, religious, or political, are excluded from the political arena?

5. What is the present number of political prisoners?

6. Are there any leaders of political factions in jail? If so, how many and who are they?

7. What is a "neutralist" in the South Vietnamese context? Can any one run for political office?

8. Finally, what is your assessment of Thieu as a political leader? Is he effective? How active is the political opposition? Is Thieu dedicated more to the establishment of a responsive and responsible government or to staying in power?

Your response to these questions should clarify the situation considerably. Both the critics and the supporters of our policy are interested in the current status of the government we are defending. Only an objective statement describing present conditions of the political fabric of South Vietnam will raise the level of debate in this country from one of exchanging accusations to one of reasoned interpretation of established facts.

I look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

LEE H. HAMILTON,
Member of Congress.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 5, 1969.

Hon. LEE H. HAMILTON,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN HAMILTON: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of November 13 concerning the Government of South Viet-Nam. The questions you raise are pertinent ones, and we welcome the opportunity to answer them.

You mention first the problem of corruption. There is no doubt that this problem is a serious one in Viet-Nam. President Thieu and other high Vietnamese officials have acknowledged this and over the past year and more have taken increasingly effective measures to reduce or eliminate corruption in government ranks.

For example, the Inspectorate, an autonomous fourth branch of government provided for in the Constitution, has now been in existence about a year and has begun to make its influence felt. Its investigations have led to the dismissal, transfer, or disciplining of a number of civil and military officials, and it has recommended that the Executive prosecute others charged with more serious offenses. The Executive has on its own taken action against corrupt and ineffective officials, including trial and imprisonment of several officials (up to and including the rank of province chief) in recent months. These punitive actions have, we believe, been salutary.

Equally significant are the procedural means of fighting corruption, and here U.S. advice and assistance has been of major importance. Our advisors have helped the Government of Viet-Nam to revise and simplify its import-licensing procedures, reduce port congestion and customs clearance time, and step up tax collections. The Vietnamese authorities have also simplified administrative procedures for various public services. All these measures have served to reduce the opportunities for, and incidence of, corruption.

While we do not have figures on the gross loss of U.S. economic and military goods due

to corruption, we do believe there has been a substantial improvement in this situation. For instance, actions by ourselves and the Vietnamese government cut the loss rate for AID-financed project commodities from 15% in 1967 to about 7% by the beginning of this year. For the Commercial Import Program, the rate of loss and diversion has been reduced from an estimated 6% in 1966 to less than 1/2%.

Despite such progress, much remains to be done about the problem of corruption, and we believe it requires redoubled efforts by all of us, Vietnamese and Americans alike. I assure you we intend to do all we can to see that these efforts are made.

We know of no evidence whatsoever that the President or Vice President are themselves involved in corruption. Quite the contrary, their public reputations for honesty are excellent.

I turn now to the questions you pose about the Vietnamese political situation.

Since he took office, President Thieu has made major efforts to broaden the base of his government by including in his cabinet representative political figures with personal or organizational followings of their own; at the same time, he has sought to maintain or increase the efficiency of government operations by appointing ministers with specific technical qualifications. Needless to say, it has not always been possible for him to realize both of these goals in every respect. From May 1968 until September of this year, his Prime Minister was Tran Van Huong, a highly respected civilian political leader and one of the President's leading opponents in the 1967 election. On September 1 President Thieu appointed a new cabinet, with General Tran Thien Khiem as Prime Minister. In the process of forming this cabinet, President Thieu offered ministerial positions to a number of political leaders; while some accepted his invitations, others declined for reasons of their own. We understand that one who declined such an invitation was Senator Tran Van Don, who in recent months has often taken positions critical of President Thieu. The present cabinet does, however, include several well-known political figures, including two unsuccessful vice-presidential candidates; the leader of a winning slate in the 1967 Upper House election; and a respected former Deputy Prime Minister in previous governments. Like its predecessor, the Khiem cabinet is balanced from the standpoint of religious and regional representation. Three of the 81 Ministers and Vice-Ministers (including the Premier) are ranking military officers. (For your information, I am enclosing summary biographic data on members of the present cabinet.)

President Thieu has also moved to broaden the base of the government at the village and hamlet level by strongly encouraging an expansion of local self-rule. Some 90% of the country's village and hamlets now have elected administrations, which have in turn been given greater responsibilities and resources as well as assistance by the central government. We believe this program has been particularly successful in generating further support for the government in recent months.

The United States believes that President Thieu's goal of broadening his government, both nationally and locally, is a highly desirable one and we have conveyed our views on this subject to him by appropriate means. At the same time, we recognize the problems which President Thieu and his government face in a society which traditionally has offered few opportunities for responsible and constructive political activity and whose constitution and democratic institutions are of recent origin.

The problem of political prisoners is a complex one, especially since the term "political prisoners" itself is frequently misused.

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The Vietnamese government is faced with having to distinguish between those engaged in what might be considered here as legitimate political dissent and those who are known or suspected to be active on behalf of the enemy in wartime. The vast majority of prisoners in South Viet-Nam (aside from common criminals) are in the latter category; the exact number in the former category, i.e. those who might more properly be called "political prisoners", is not known but is believed to be quite small. We do not know of any leaders of political factions in jail except possibly for Mr. Truong Dinh Dzu, who, although he leads no particular political organization, did run second in the 1967 presidential election. (He was prosecuted for later actions involving statements he made to the press several months after the election.)

No ethnic or religious groups are excluded from political activity in South Viet-Nam, and indeed, many such groups are conspicuously active on the political scene. The only political groups or individuals excluded are those who are communist or pro-communist, i.e., those who support the attempt by Hanoi and the Viet Cong to overthrow the legal government by violence and terror.

In the Vietnamese political context the terms "neutralist" and "neutralism" have highly unfavorable connotations; they have been used by persons who advocate the removal of the present government by extra-constitutional means and collaboration with the Viet Cong. It is presumably for this reason that the 1967 election laws excluded "pro-communist neutralists", along with communists, from running for office. There are no other political or ideological limitations on the eligibility of candidates to run for office. Legitimate neutralist political activity is obviously permitted, as recent actions by certain political figures in Saigon have indicated.

Finally, in answer to your last question, President Thieu's actions over the past year or more would seem to indicate that he is indeed dedicated to the establishment of a "responsive and responsible government", as you put it. He and his colleagues have improved the effectiveness of the government significantly, have mobilized the population more effectively in its own defense, and have expanded security, economic activity, and local self-government in the countryside. They have done this in cooperation with a vigorous and independent National Assembly and within the over-all democratic framework established by the Constitution, despite inexperience and very difficult wartime conditions. Legitimate opposition exists and is expressed openly within this framework.

We think these efforts by the South Vietnamese leadership of all persuasions and at all levels are worthy of our continued support and encouragement. Both we and they recognize that serious problems remain, some of which you touch on in your questions. We intend to cooperate with the Vietnamese and to assist wherever we can as they meet these problems.

I hope the above will be useful to you in considering this matter. If I can be of further assistance, please let me know at your convenience.

Sincerely yours,

H. G. TORBERT, Jr.,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

SUMMARY BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON MEMBERS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE CABINET APPOINTED SEPTEMBER 1, 1969

Prime Minister and Minister of Interior: Tran Thien Khiem. Born Saigon, 1925. Buddhist. Military officer, 1946 to the present, with rank of full general since August 1964. Chief of Joint General Staff, 1962-63; commander of III Corps Tactical Zone, 1964. Participant in military coup which overthrew Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 and in coup of Janu-

ary 1964 which installed Nguyen Khanh. Ambassador to the United States, 1964-65, and to the Republic of China, 1965-68. Minister of Interior since May 1968; in addition, Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Pacification and Reconstruction, March-August 1969.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education: Nguyen Luu Vien. Born Vinh Binh province (southern Viet-Nam), 1919. Buddhist. Physician and professor of medicine. Medical officer with the Viet Minh from late 1940's until about 1951. Signer of the "Caravelle petition," requesting reforms in the Diem government, 1960; imprisoned 1960-61. Member, Council of Notables, 1963-64. Minister of Interior and Deputy Prime Minister in cabinet of Tran Van Huong, 1964-65. Civilian member of the National Leadership Committee (Directorate), 1966-67; also Deputy Prime Minister for Social and Cultural Affairs, 1966-67.

Minister of State for Cultural Affairs: Mai Tho Truyen. Born Kien Hoa province (southern Viet-Nam), 1905. Buddhist. Retired civil servant. Began civil service career in 1924. Chief of administrative services in Long Xuyen province for the Viet Minh, 1945-46. Subsequent career included positions as director of cabinet in Ministries of Economy, Foreign Affairs and Interior 1946-55, and as inspector of administrative and financial affairs in the Presidency from 1955 until his retirement in 1960. President of the Association for Buddhist Studies, 1956; Vice-president of the General Association of Vietnamese Buddhists, 1959; and founder of the Southern Buddhist Studies Association, 1964. Member of the Council of Notables, 1963-64. Vice-presidential running-mate of Tran Van Huong in 1967 elections. First appointed Minister of State in the Huong cabinet, May 1968.

Minister of State for Reconstruction and Development: Vu Quoc Thuc. Born Nam Dinh province (North Viet-Nam), 1920. Catholic. Economist and scholar; licentiate in law from the University of Hanoi and Ph. D. in economics from the University of Paris. Assistant dean, faculty of law, Hanoi, 1951-53. Minister of Education in the Buu Loc government, 1953-54. Governor of the National Bank of Viet-Nam, 1955-56. Dean of the faculty of Law, University of Saigon, 1957-63. Author of several specialized legal works and economic studies. Unsuccessful candidate for Upper House of the National Assembly, 1967. Head of the Post-War Planning Study Group, in collaboration with Dr. David Lilienthal, since February 1967. Originally appointed Minister of State in the cabinet of Tran Van Huong in May 1968, and continues in that position.

Minister of State (without portfolio): Phan Quang Dan. Born in Nghe An province (central Viet-Nam, north of 17th parallel), 1918. Buddhist. Physician, graduate of the University of Hanoi and holder of Master of Public Health degree from Harvard University. Long political career, dating from at least 1940. Minister of Information 1948-49. Early opponent of Ngo Dinh Diem; only opposition candidate elected to the National Assembly in 1959, but not permitted to take his seat because of alleged violation of electoral laws. Arrested by Diem in 1960 and held without trial until June 1963; then sentenced to seven years' imprisonment, but released after Diem's overthrow. Elected to the Gia Dinh provincial council in May 1965 by a large majority and chosen by the council to serve as its chairman. Chairman of the National Political Congress in 1966 and elected to the Constituent Assembly from Gia Dinh province later that year; had active role in drafting of the present Constitution. Survived an assassination attempt in December 1966. Running-mate of Phan Khắc Suu, third-place finisher in presidential election of 1967.

Minister of State (without portfolio): Nguyen Tien Hy. Born Hanoi (North Viet-Nam) 1915. Physician, educated in Viet-Nam.

Formerly associated with the anti-French and anti-Communist *Dai Viet* party, established in the late 1930's. Signer of the "Caravelle petition," 1960, together with Nguyen Luu Vien (above). Member, Council of Notables, 1963-64. Minister of State for Education in the government of Phan Huy Quat, 1965. Unsuccessful candidate for Upper House of the National Assembly, 1967.

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Tran Van Lam. Born Cholon section of Saigon, 1913. Catholic. Pharmacist. Elected to Saigon City Council, 1952. Government delegate (regional administrative officer) for southern Viet-Nam, 1954-56. Member and president of Constituent Assembly elected 1956, which subsequently became National Assembly, and president of latter until 1957 at which time he became majority leader; re-elected in 1959. Resigned to become Ambassador to Australia, 1961-64 (concurrently Ambassador to New Zealand, 1962-64). Elected to Upper House of the National Assembly as leader of a ten-member list of candidates, September 1967. Member of finance and foreign affairs committees and later chairman of the interior committee, until taking leave from Upper House to assume present position.

Minister of Defense: Nguyen Van Vy. Born Hanoi, 1916. Buddhist. Military officer, beginning approximately 1940, with extensive experience in infantry and airborne units and also in staff assignments. Military advisor to the Vietnamese delegation at the Geneva Conference, 1954. Political exile in France, 1955-63. Returned to Viet-Nam late 1963 and rejoined Vietnamese Army; served as chief of staff at the Joint General Staff from November 1966 until appointment as Minister of Defense in the cabinet of Nguyen Van Loc, November 1967. Has continued in that position to date. Promoted to lieutenant general, October 1967.

Minister of Justice: Le Van Thu. Born Saigon 1915. Buddhist. Lawyer, with degree from the University of Hanoi, and former journalist. Officer in the French Army, 1939-43; customs official, 1943-45. Active in the resistance against the French, 1945-51. Publisher and editor of a daily newspaper and a weekly magazine in Saigon, 1952-56. Attorney, 1952 to date, and for a time chairman of the Court of Appeals. Member of the Council of Notables, 1963, and of the High National Council (and chairman of its constitution-drafting committee), 1964. First appointed Minister of Justice in the Huong cabinet, May 1968, and continues in that capacity.

Minister of Economy: Pham Kim Ngoc. Born Hanoi, 1928. Investment banker. Served for six months with the Viet Minh at the age of 17. Graduate of the London School of Economics, 1955. Employed by *Credit Commercial*, largest commercial bank in Viet-Nam, 1955-68 (deputy director-general, 1959-68). Served briefly as Deputy Minister for Economy in 1967 and as special assistant to the Minister of Economy in 1968. Organized own investment and banking firm, The Saigon Trading Company, in 1968.

Minister of Finance: Nguyen Bich Hue. Born Hue (central Viet-Nam), 1924. Buddhist. Educated in France, where he received law degree, 1951; graduated from Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, 1953; and from Ecole National d'Administration, 1955. Employed by the National Bank of Viet-Nam, 1956-69, rising to director-general (1968). Author of numerous articles on economics and monetary affairs.

Minister of Revolutionary Development: Tran Thanh Phong. Born Vinh Binh province (southern Viet-Nam), 1926. Buddhist. Began military career at officer candidate school in 1951 and rose through infantry-command and staff assignments to become division commander; chief of operations of the Joint General Staff (1965); and chief of staff, JGS (1967). Promoted to rank of major general, 1966.

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Minister of Information: Ngo Khac Tinh. Born Ninh Thuan province (central Viet-Nam), 1923. Buddhist. Pharmacist. Served in the National Assembly, 1957-63 and as its deputy secretary-general, 1960-62. Unsuccessful candidate for the Upper House of the National Assembly, 1967. Recently associated with the Revolutionary Social Humanist party.

Minister of Chieu Hoi (Returnee Program): Ho Van Cham. Born Thua Thien province (central Viet-Nam), 1932. Confucianist. Physician; studied medicine in Hanoi and Saigon, with degree from the latter university in 1959, and interned at St. Luke's Hospital, New York, 1964-66. Member of the Vietnamese Army medical corps since 1958; author of many articles on military medicine. Unsuccessful candidate for Upper House of the National Assembly, 1967. Member of the Revolutionary Dai Viet party.

Minister of Land Reform, Agriculture and Fisheries: Cao Van Than. Born Saigon, 1932. Holds law degree from the University of Paris and master's degree in economics from the University of Pittsburgh. Advisor to President Thieu, prior to appointment to this position in revised cabinet of Tran Van Huong, March 1969.

Minister of Public Works: Duong Kich Nhuong. Born My Tho (southern Viet-Nam), 1932. Buddhist. Hydro-electric engineer, educated at the University of Grenoble in France. Government experience in the Directorate-General of Planning, 1957-59, and as director of cabinet of the Ministry of Public Works and Communications, 1963-64. Also in private employment, most recently as director of the Tan Mai Paper Mill Company, 1969-69.

Minister of Communications and Post: Tran Van Vien. Born in Cholon district of Saigon, 1932. Buddhist. Engineer; graduate of the National School of Telecommunications in Paris. Previous positions: Head of the National School of Post and Telecommunications, Saigon; regional postmaster for southern Viet-Nam; Director of Telecommunications.

Minister of Health: Tran Minh Tung. Born in Saigon, 1930. Catholic. Physician and specialist in internal medicine. Graduate of the medical school of the University of Hanoi, 1955. Member of the Army medical corps, with the rank of colonel; previously assigned as commandant of the Army Medical School. Also secretary-general of the Vietnamese Medical Association.

Minister of Social Welfare: Tran Nguon Phieu. Born in Gia Dinh province (southern Viet-Nam), 1927. Buddhist. Physician, with medical degree from the University of Bordeaux. Member of military medical corps for 17 years, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel. Unsuccessful candidate for Lower House of National Assembly, 1967. Served as Secretary of State for Refugee and Social Affairs in the cabinet of Nguyen Van Loc, 1967-68, and as special assistant to the Minister of Health, Social Welfare and Relief, 1968-69. One of principal organizers of relief measures after Communists' Tet offensive of early 1968.

Minister of Veterans' Affairs: Pham Van Dong. Born in Son Tay province (northern Viet-Nam), 1919. Buddhist. Former Army officer. Joined French Army in 1939 and fought against the Japanese in Viet-Nam and southern China. Rose to become division commander, deputy corps commander, and commander of the Capital Military District (Saigon and vicinity). Retired in 1965 with the rank of major general. Subsequently associated with several veterans' organizations and with the National Salvation Front, a political organization founded in 1968 by Senator Tran Van Don.

Minister of Labor: Dam Sy Hien. Born Nam Dinh province (North Viet-Nam), 1914. Confucian Buddhist. Lawyer and economist. Civil servant in North Viet-Nam from 1945 until

1954, when he fled to the South. Subsequently worked as staff member of the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CVT) and participated in many ICFTU and other international labor conferences. Minister of Social Welfare in Khanh and Huong government, 1964-65. Appointed Minister of Labor in Huong cabinet, May 1968, and continues in that position.

Minister of Ethnic Minority Development: Paul Nur. Born Kontum province (central Viet-Nam), 1925; member of the Bahnar tribe of the central highlands. Catholic. Former school teacher and civil servant. Teacher and headmaster of elementary school in Kontum, 1943-58. A leader of the Highland Autonomy Movement, as result of which he was imprisoned by the Diem regime, 1958-63. Deputy Province Chief of Kontum for Montagnard Affairs, 1963-65. Special Commissioner for Montagnard Affairs, 1964-67. First appointed to present position November 1967.

Minister of State at the Prime Minister's Office: Nguyen Van Vang. Born in Kien Hoa province (southern Viet-Nam), 1915. Career civil servant, 1946-59, with experience as district chief, province chief, special assistant to the president for Chinese affairs, and government delegate (regional administrative officer). Served with Inspector General's office from 1965 until his appointment as Minister of Revolutionary Development in the Huong Cabinet, March 1969.

Minister of State for Parliamentary Relations: Cao Van Tuong. Born in Hue (central Viet-Nam), 1916. Catholic. Holds degree of licentiate in law. Served with the Viet-Minh, 1946-51. Civil servant in the Ministry of Labor, 1952-56. Elected to the National Assembly in 1956 and served for a time as its deputy chairman. Legislative advisor to the Lower House of the present National Assembly before his appointment to this position.

In addition to the 24 men listed above, there are seven vice-ministers who are considered members of the Cabinet:

Vice-Minister of Economy (for Industry): Pham Minh Duong. (Southerner)

Second Vice-Minister of Economy (for Commerce): Tran Chu Uong. (Northerner; Buddhist)

Vice Minister of Finance: Ha Xuan Trung. (Central Viet-Nam; Buddhist)

Vice Minister of Education: Tran Luu Cung. (Northerner; Buddhist)

Second Vice Minister of Education: Nguyen Danh Dan. M.D. (Northerner; Buddhist)

Vice Minister of Interior: Le Cong Chat. (Southerner, Confucianist)

Vice Minister of Information: Le Trong Kut, attorney. (Central Viet-Nam Buddhist)

DECEMBER 16, 1969.

H. G. TORBERT, Jr.,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. TORBERT: Thank you for your letter of December 5. Your efforts in answering my questions are greatly appreciated. Several issues I raised, however, are still unresolved in my mind.

With regard to my question of "What is the U.S. doing to encourage Thieu and Ky to broaden their political base?" you replied only that "we have conveyed our views on this subject to him by appropriate means." I am wondering what "appropriate means" are? The question is what specific steps have we taken to encourage the South Vietnamese government to broaden its base.

With regard to the cabinet formed on September 1, you state that it is "balanced from the standpoint of religious and regional representation." This does not indicate its political orientation, which has been regarded in the American press as being more narrowly and loyally pro-Thieu than its predecessor. Did not the reshuffling reduce rather than enlarge Thieu's political base?

Third, you state that the number of political prisoners is "small." Could you indicate a numerical figure? A *New York Times* article of October 25, 1969, gave a figure of about 5,000 noncommunist political prisoners. Does this coincide with your estimates? What is our position on their imprisonment, and what specific steps have been taken by the U.S. Government to have them released?

Concerning Truong Dinh Dzu, what was the nature of the statements he made that resulted in his imprisonment? What was he charged with? What is our position with regard to his imprisonment, and has the U.S. Government made any efforts to have him released?

Finally, on the question of a neutralist, what is the difference between a "pro-communist neutralist" (your phrase) and a person advocating a coalition government of communist and non-communists? Is the latter apt to be punished for his views?

Your comments on the above questions would be appreciated.

I look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

LEE H. HAMILTON,
Member of Congress.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., January 26, 1970.

Hon. LEE H. HAMILTON,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN HAMILTON: I am writing in response to your letter of December 16, in which you raise a number of questions about my reply of December 5 to your earlier letter concerning the political situation in South Viet-Nam.

On the general subject of "broadening" of the Government of Viet-Nam, I am sure you recognize that this is a matter of Vietnamese domestic politics. Of course, insofar as it relates to that government's ability to carry out more effectively the South Vietnamese people's current struggle against Communist aggression and subversion, it is a subject in which the United States, as Viet-Nam's principal ally, has an obvious interest. When I mentioned our having conveyed our views "by appropriate means," I was referring to our expression of this interest in communications and conversations undertaken through normal diplomatic channels and contacts.

In this manner we have indicated support of various programs and courses of action which in our opinion would contribute to further strengthening of the Vietnamese government's political base and popular following. We have, for example, noted our support of expansion of responsible local government, which I described to you previously. As another example, we also have offered our assistance to President Thieu's proposed new land reform program, which we believe can make a further significant contribution.

With specific regard to the Vietnamese cabinet reorganization effected on September 1, 1969, we were of course sympathetic to President Thieu's declared hope of forming a new cabinet which would be as broadly representative as possible but which would at the same time enhance governmental efficiency and improve executive-legislative relations. We also realized, however, that all these goals would not be easy to achieve.

It is difficult to measure the extent to which any cabinet represents a "broadening" or a narrowing of a national leader's political base, particularly in a governmental system such as Viet-Nam's where primary executive authority is vested in the President rather than in the Prime Minister or the Cabinet. In the recent reorganization, press attention here focused mainly on the replacement of a civilian prime minister and proven vote-getter, Mr. Tran Van Huong, by a military man, General Tran Thien Kiem. Less often noted, however, was the addition as Minis-

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ters of State of another vote-getter, Dr. Phan Quang Dan, and a respected Southern civilian, Dr. Nguyen Luu Vlen, who appears to speak for much of the same constituency as Mr. Huong. (Minister of State Mai Tho Truyen, Mr. Huong's running-mate in 1967, remained in the Cabinet.) As I noted in my previous letter, President Thieu reportedly asked still other representatives of political groupings—including some of those in the "opposition"—to join the government, but they apparently declined for reasons of their own, perhaps relating to their own personal political ambitions.

I turn now to the questions you raise on the subject of "political prisoners." I regret that the information available to us does not provide an adequate basis for a reply to your inquiry in numerical terms. Part of the problem here is that of defining the term "political prisoners", as I described in my previous letter.

While we recognize that this problem is essentially an internal Vietnamese matter, we do not of course condone arrests and detentions on purely political grounds (i.e. as a result of what would normally be considered legitimate political activity) and have made our views known in appropriate fashion. We feel the Vietnamese authorities are aware that shortcomings exist in the administration of justice in South Vietnam and are making serious efforts to remedy such shortcomings. These include efforts to clarify existing laws and decrees, to speed the disposition of cases and the release of suspects against whom there is insufficient evidence to warrant prosecution, and to expand and improve detention facilities and procedures. We have generally encouraged and supported the Vietnamese in these efforts and we are rendering specific technical and other assistance where we usefully can.

According to the information we have on the case of Mr. Truong Dinh Dzu, he was convicted in July 1968 on charges of committing "acts aimed at weakening the anti-communist spirit and struggle of the people and the armed forces," in violation of Article 17 of Decree Law 004/65, dated July 19, 1965. These charges derived from statements Mr. Dzu made to the press in April 1968 in which he apparently advocated a "coalition government" with the National Liberation Front.

Without in any sense attempting to defend or otherwise pass judgment on the Vietnamese government's actions in this case, I think it is important to recognize the connotation of the term "coalition government" in the present Vietnamese context. To most politically-aware Vietnamese, the term recalls the experience of non-communist nationalists who in good faith participated in Ho Chi Minh's coalition government of 1946 but who were quickly repressed and in many cases executed by the Communists. Many Vietnamese are equally aware of the Communist concept of coalition government as it has been applied elsewhere, notably in Czechoslovakia after World War II.

In regard to our position concerning Mr. Dzu's imprisonment and the question of his being released, his case is of course a matter between the Government of Viet-Nam and one of its own citizens. We have nevertheless followed the case closely and have noted to the Vietnamese authorities our interest in it. I assure you we will continue to do so as appropriate.

I cited the phrase "pro-communist neutralist" in my letter of December 5 in response to your question: "Can anyone run for office?" the term is not ours, but rather a literal translation from the Vietnamese laws—voted by the Constituent Assembly—which governed the 1967 Presidential, Upper House and Lower House elections. The complete text of the relevant clause (identical in the three electoral laws) is as follows:

laws: "The following persons will not be allowed to be candidates: . . . Those who have directly or indirectly worked for communism or pro-communist neutralism or worked in the interests of communism." To the best of our knowledge, the question whether advocacy of coalition government with the Communists is tantamount to "pro-communist neutralism," within the meaning of the 1967 electoral laws, did not arise. I would point out, however, that in recent weeks some prominent public figures in Vietnam have openly and freely advocated a "third force" domestic government and a "neutral" foreign policy for the Republic of Viet-Nam. I think it possible to conclude, therefore, that within the Vietnamese political context, advocacy of "neutralism" is not automatically interpreted or regarded as "pro-communist neutralism."

I hope that this information will be useful to you in your further consideration of this matter.

Sincerely yours,

H. G. TORBERT, JR.,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

HON. JOSEPH P. ROSTENKOWSKI

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. ALBERT).

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, the Honorable Joseph P. Rostenkowski, former collector of customs, passed away at Frank Cuneo Memorial Hospital on Sunday, February 8, 1970.

He was the alderman of the 83d ward from 1931 to 1955. He was also ward committeeman and served continuously in that capacity from 1936 to 1960. When he retired, he was appointed by President John F. Kennedy as collector of customs of the port of Chicago.

His first elected office was as State senator from the 27th senatorial district of Illinois to the 57th general assembly. Twenty-five years later, his son DAN served as State senator from this area for 6 years.

Mr. Rostenkowski was a pioneer in organizing various activities for young people in the Polish Roman Catholic Union. He served in the U.S. Army during World War I and was also an active member of the American Legion. He was a member of the LaSalle General Assembly, Knights of Columbus, Lafayette Council, Northwest Kiwanis Club, and Loyal Order of the Moose.

Mr. Rostenkowski served as a delegate to the Democratic National Convention in 1936, 1940, 1944, 1948, and 1952. While serving as alderman in the city council, for 25 years, he was chairman of the committee on schools, chairman of the licenses committee, and the important rules committee.

He is survived by his son, Congressman DAN ROSTENKOWSKI and two daughters Marcia and Gladys Rostenkowski.

The body will be at the Stanley Funeral Home, 3060 North Milwaukee Avenue, Chicago, Ill., on Tuesday and Wednesday with funeral services on Thursday morning at 10 a.m. at the St. Stanislaus Kostka Church, 1351 West Evergreen, Chicago.

Mr. Speaker, I join all Members in extending our deep condolences to our beloved colleague, DAN ROSTENKOWSKI, on the passing of his father.

PRESERVATION OF THE QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT

(Mr. EVINS of Tennessee asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, the matter of the improvement of the quality of our environment and the preservation of our heritage has become a national issue and a national concern.

To respond to this challenge requires a national commitment and Congress has clearly demonstrated its intent and its determination to act to solve this problem of pollution of our air, water, and land.

In this connection I am today introducing a bill to establish a major new public agency to promote the improvement of the quality of our environment through the establishment of at least six regional national laboratories to conduct research into all aspects of pollution and to provide information upon which decisions affecting the environment may be made.

I am pleased to join Senator HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., of Tennessee, and Senator EDMUND S. MUSKIE, of Maine, in sponsoring this bill. A companion bill is being introduced in the Senate.

The concept of this bill and the network of laboratories it would authorize originated in Oak Ridge, Tenn., where much environmental research is underway in the laboratories of the Atomic Energy Commission.

MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING CONSTRUCTION TO PROCEED

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, the Department of Defense has informed me that approval has been obtained from the administration and the Bureau of the Budget to proceed with the construction of military family housing. This is an exception to the general reduction in Federal construction announced last September.

The President announced, on September 4, 1969, that he had directed all agencies of the Federal Government to put into effect immediately a 75-percent reduction in new contracts for Government construction. Although the intention of this construction reduction was, at least in part, to "release resources of home-building" in order to meet the great need for more housing, the application of this reduction delayed the construction of more than 2,800 units of family housing for the military.

I wrote Secretary Laird on September 15 as follows:

I am extremely concerned about the impact on the Military Construction Program of the construction cutbacks announced by President Nixon on September 4.

The Committee has heard ample evidence from Department of Defense witnesses of the pressing backlog of construction needs, estimated at \$19.6 billion. The inability to meet these needs degrades the efficiency and effectiveness of the Services' operations. Past experiences with freezes directed to the Military Construction Program, the Reserve Forces Facilities Program, and the Family

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Housing Program indicate that as a result of such freezes, needed facilities are built in a less-than-adequate manner, at higher cost, or both.

More important is the effect on the morale and well-being of our servicemen of inadequate housing, both family housing and bachelor housing. This Committee has often voiced the suspicion that the housing needs of members of the Armed Services and of their dependents are given a lower priority than those of their fellow citizens who are civilians. If the Administration feels that adequate housing of our citizens rates a high priority, then this ought to be reflected in greatly increased budget requests for military family housing and bachelor quarters, not in a freeze on this construction.

Testimony before this Committee on the fiscal 1970 budget request indicates that the estimated deficiency at the end of fiscal year 1974 for married personnel entitled to quarters amounts to 121,600 units. There are a mere 4800 units requested in the family housing construction budget this year. I urge you to make the strongest efforts to have the Family Housing Program excluded from any construction freeze and to proceed with a reasonable program in this area without further delay.

I am glad to report that Secretary Laird has persisted in his efforts to have military family housing excluded from the freeze. As a result, the Budget Bureau is releasing some 2,840 family housing units, in addition to the 2,422 units which the Department of Defense had scheduled for construction, for a total of 5,262 homes to be awarded in fiscal year 1970.

There is still a large housing deficiency to be met in order to adequately house military families. It is estimated to be as high as 120,000 units. I hope that the release of this housing in fiscal year 1970 and the somewhat more generous request for 8,000 units in fiscal year 1971 represents a decision by the administration to provide adequate housing for the families of military personnel. In my view, this is important not only to insure that military families receive adequate housing but to show the many dedicated personnel who serve in our Armed Forces that, in spite of much of the rhetoric which has become currently fashionable, we do appreciate their diligence, their dedication, and their service.

DEMOCRAT STATE OF THE UNION REBUTTAL

(Mr. BERRY asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Speaker, the Democrat state of the Union rebuttal yesterday was fairly interesting. After 1 year, President Nixon is to blame for the inflation created by their 8 years of spending, Vietnam after their 8 years of war, and pollution that hardly raised its ugly head in the past 8 years, but now has become a great political issue.

The most interesting challenge, however, was laid down by at least two of their staff when they charged that farm subsidies were responsible for the high cost of groceries. This may sound good to the woman on the other side of the grocery counter, but I wonder if they would be interested in meeting the situation head on.

In order to keep prices down for the

consumer, this Nation is importing \$500 million more livestock and dairy products than it exports. We wonder if they would be willing to place some sort of embargo on these imports and give the American farmer the American market for his product. If he had this, he would ask no subsidy or no support from the Federal Treasury.

Livestock and dairy production is responsible for 70 to 75 percent of the farm income of the Middle West and yet most of the one and a quarter billion dollars worth of meat and dairy products imported is in direct competition with products produced in our Midwest.

Let us not condemn one side of the coin without turning to the other side to get the full reason for some of these measures. Agriculture does not want these subsidies. All agriculture asks is a free chance at a free market where the consumer is not subsidized by excessive agricultural imports.

WHY HANOI FIGHTS ON

(Mr. BERRY asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Speaker, I was amazed at the statement of my colleague, the junior member of the South Dakota delegation in the other body in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee last week when he attacked Maj. James "Nick" Rowe for making public statements to the effect that Hanoi has been using speeches from U.S. Senators and other men of influence to bolster the enemy morale.

In my article in the February 1970 issue of the Reader's Digest entitled "From Hanoi—With Thanks," there is a documentary report on how Hanoi has been using these statements, the facts of these statements, the marches, and moratoriums to prolong the war through bolstering morale of their people by using these quotes and these facts.

In addition to the documentary is the statement of Edmund A. Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School of Law Diplomacy, Tufts University, entitled "Why Hanoi Fights On." Before becoming dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Edmund Gullion served the U.S. Department of State in many posts in Europe, Africa, and the Far East. He was deputy chief of the American mission in Saigon from 1950 to 1953, and Ambassador to the Congo from 1961 to 1964. Mr. Gullion recently visited South Vietnam with a delegation from the Citizen's Committee for Peace With Freedom in Vietnam.

Gullion's statement follows:

While Hanoi broadcasts its thanks to the Americans who march in protest against the war, there are other Americans who see the repetition of a grim and familiar pattern. Hanoi moves by the same calculations which paid off for it in the defeat of the French in 1954.

As the late Ho Chi Minh once told the French: "You will kill ten of our men and we will kill one of yours. And in the end, it will be you who will tire of it." French power was shaken but not shattered by the defeat at Dienbienphu. What broke France was the collapse of will on the home front. The French were fighting to preserve a hold in

Vietnam. The Americans fight to preserve the right of the South Vietnamese—the vast majority of whom fear and reject Hanoi—to choose and live by their own government. But North Vietnam, having seen one Western power worn down by sapping tactics on the home front, is sure the same strategy will pay off again. Indeed, this is what the declarations in the Hanoi press and radio are all about.

In Vietnam today, the enemy grows weaker as our side grows stronger. The situation is still precarious but President Nixon's Vietnamization plan shows real signs of working. The bitter paradox is that Hanoi grows more resolute as American will seems to waver here at home. (This would appear to be wishful thinking on the part of Hanoi, in view of the recent Gallup poll and the resolution by the House of Representatives strongly supporting the President's plan.) If the enemy believes that public opinion will force an immediate American pullout, he has no reason to negotiate at Paris or anywhere else. So long as he believes the "peace-marchers" are marching not for peace but for him, he will carry on the fight, and more American and Vietnamese men will lose their lives.

The documentary report from the Reader's Digest is as follows:

"End the war now!" "Get out of Vietnam!" Such cries are heard in peace demonstrations across America today. For the most part, they are voiced by sincere, well-meaning citizens who genuinely want peace. But an anxious public, however sympathetic with every American's right to dissent, should nonetheless ponder the real effect of such demonstrations. To what degree do they prolong the war by comforting Hanoi with the false assurance that the United States is rapidly losing its resolve to defend South Vietnam and will soon abandon it to the communists?

Hanoi itself has provided the answer—with a calculated arrogance that clearly explains its intransigence at the Paris peace talks. Here, traced from 1966 to the present, is a sampling, in somewhat condensed form, of the abundant evidence from North Vietnam's own information sources. The record shows that the enemy not only is closely informed about the demonstrations in the United States, but is also counting on them to help him win the war.

The North Vietnamese newspaper Nhan Dan, February 27, 1968:

In America the debates on the Vietnamese problem will become increasingly fiercer. The U.S. imperialist rear will be the scene of great confusion, which in turn will exert great influence upon the morale of the U.S. servicemen on the front line. That is why the Johnson clique is very perplexed and afraid, faced with the ever stronger anti-war movement which, like a sharp knife, is stabbing them in the back.

Radio Hanoi, November 6, 1966:

The Vietnamese people hail and support the struggle waged by the American people against the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam, said Dr. Le Dinh Tham, chairman of the Vietnam Peace Committee. "This struggle is a valuable encouragement and backing for the Vietnamese people, who sincerely thank the American peace fighters for their efforts to strengthen their solidarity with the Vietnamese people and coordinate their struggle with them."

Radio Hanoi, November 8, 1966:

The Vietnamese people highly value the protest movement of the American people. We praise the American peace champions who courageously turned the courts which were trying them into forums to condemn the war. We praise the American journalists and writers who, in defiance of repression and